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MODERNITY’S 
REGIMES OF 
WONDERMENT
Jonathan P. Eburne and 
Aaron Jaffe
Curious Visions of Modernity: 
Enchantment, Magic, and the 
Sacred by David L. Martin. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2011. xviii + 255 pages. $32.95 
cloth.
When Walter Benjamin writes in 
Convolute N of the Arcades Project 
that he has “nothing to say, only to 
show,” does anyone really believe 
him?1 David L. Martin cites this 
well-known statement in the first 
pages of his excellent study Curious 
Visions of Modernity. He does so 
less to explain his own methods, 
however, than to invoke some-
thing of a modernist incantation. 
Indeed, Benjamin’s dictum echoes 
a line by Pablo Picasso borrowed 
by Jacques Lacan in Seminar 11: 
“I do not seek, I find.”2 Where we 
might expect to find a statement of 
method, Lacan instead presents us 
with findings. As Sigmund Freud 
said, “Wo es war, soll ich werden.” 
(Where it [the id] was, I [the ego] 
shall be.) What is curious, though, 
is that the claim itself—“I don’t 
seek, I find”—discloses the very 
methodological reflection it pro-
fesses to withhold, albeit in the 
form of a borrowed line, a resonant 
fragment of historical discourse.
By the time Lacan gets to 
Seminar 24, moreover, even finding 
is off the table: “Long ago, I hap-
pened to say, imitating a famous 
painter, ‘I don’t seek, I find.’ At 
the point I’m at now, I don’t find 
as long as I don’t seek.”3 Of course, 
there’s more to such statements 
than merely the showy disavowal 
of method—how could there not 
be? Still, there’s something of the 
conjuring trick in these inscruta-
ble mottos. Don’t find, don’t seek, 
don’t even tell: our eyes are directed 
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elsewhere, thereby sustaining the 
master’s sleight of hand. Such 
claims thus amount to something 
other than a hermeneutic (or an 
object-oriented ontology). Rather 
than inducing us to heed the call 
of things from within the tangle 
of discourse that enshrouds them, 
these utterances instead comprise 
the magic words of philosophical 
stagecraft, a theoretical version of 
welcome to the show, presto, hocus 
pocus, abracadabra. Reason supplies 
its own magic words: the terms say-
ing, showing, seeking, finding, and 
telling all have ordinary meanings, 
yet they are no less caught up in the 
irrational constellation of terms in 
Martin’s subtitle—enchantment, 
magic, and the sacred. Insofar as 
these common participles also 
underwrite the formation of mod-
ern rationality of the scientific sort, 
they also have complex critical 
genealogies, which Martin’s book 
aims to trace.
In his three-part study of early 
modern cabinets of curiosity, ana-
tomical specimens, and pictorial 
technologies, Martin examines the 
“stagecraft” that underpins the way 
modern science—not to mention 
philosophy—has been able to make 
inert matter speak (60). Michel 
Foucault, whose work underpins 
Martin’s study in profound ways, 
named his version of this stagecraft 
“archaeology.” Benjamin likens his 
own approach to montage. Martin’s 
is more akin to Industrial Light and 
Magic, full of stunning  archival 
pyrotechnics, and appropriate to 
the “regime of wonderment” he 
wants to rescue. As Martin writes,
When the task of the scholar 
was to get objects to speak 
of the truth that was hidden 
within them, a truth that 
only the object itself fully 
“knew,” illumination came 
through an act of unpack-
ing the microcosmic collec-
tion, of arranging the words 
of the text of creation so that 
one might interpret the sig-
natures inscribed within all 
things. In this setting, the 
fake often pointed to higher 
truths. (45)
Like Benjamin, Martin is interested 
in exhibiting telling fragments; he 
indicates by pointing out, illustrat-
ing, and illuminating. On this front, 
he offers a telling confession: “For 
many years,” he writes, “I have been 
something of an academic collec-
tor, watching out for fragments and 
broken pieces of early modern visual 
culture discarded and scattered by 
the vagaries of historical discourse” 
(xi). What he exhibits in Curious 
Visions are holdovers of early mod-
ern curiosity—“the fragment, the 
narrative, the excursion, the fleet-
ing glance, the sympathy, and the 
resonance” (ix)—that animate the 
scientific practices he features in 
his book: the assembly of collec-
tions, the examination of human 
anatomy, and the making of maps. 
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Martin shows how these things 
 disclose their theatrical and talis-
manic powers in curiosity cabinets, 
operation theaters, and map rooms, 
and then how they harden into the 
disciplinary apparatus of scientific 
rationality in museology, anatomy, 
and cartography. The book’s second 
section on the twinned discovery 
of the corpse and the corpus of 
 knowledge is especially striking, 
laying out how the handling of the 
dead invigorates and haunts the 
structures of knowledge that inform 
medical science, through the work 
of the anatomist Andreas Vesalius, 
as well as Rembrandt’s Anatomy 
Lesson of Dr Nicolaes Tulp (1632). 
Here, as throughout his study, 
Martin’s project of scholarship-as-
collecting bears a double imperative: 
On the one hand, it documents how 
the curious, wondrous, and even 
magical qualities of such hetero-
geneous corpuses become the very 
means through which early modern 
scientific practices establish norms. 
The “fabulous exemplar” becomes, 
in other words, a technology for 
disciplinary regulation. On the 
other hand, Martin’s work strives 
to restore to such exemplars the het-
erogeneity and strangeness against 
which they have been instrumental-
ized; for Martin, modern rational-
ity is always shot through with the 
fragmentary curiosities from which 
it emerged.
As its archaeological project sug-
gests, Martin’s book owes as much 
to Foucault as to Benjamin; its three 
principal sites of attention—collec-
tions, bodies, and spaces—stand 
in for Foucault’s favorite genea-
logical haunts: mental asylums, 
prisons, and natural histories. The 
theoretical pairing of Benjamin 
and Foucault effects a productive 
synthesis for Martin in his “‘archae-
ology’ of the visual,” which, as 
he writes, is “aimed precisely at 
redressing the modern proclivity 
toward the production of monu-
ments” (xv). Curious Visions is very 
much a book about method, but a 
book that refuses to reify its meth-
odology as anything other than a set 
of performances and magical tricks. 
The project is well suited to the 
capacious multidisciplinary zone of 
visual studies, engaging and impli-
cating the fields of museology, art 
history, anthropology, science, and 
postcolonial studies. His approach 
is suspicious of textuality and the 
linguistic turn: “Modernity’s binary 
relationship between signs and their 
signifiers has tended to conflate 
the act of writing with the logic of 
the catalog: tying down ideas and 
meaning in definitive forms. In 
this regard, the modern commen-
tary errs towards assessment and 
opposition, not the invitation to re-
collection” (42). Martin’s suspicion 
toward telling—and toward dis-
cursivity more broadly—neverthe-
less yields a substantive proposition 
for contemporary scholarship—
namely, that we heed the magic 
words of propositional discourse as 
part of the show.
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In his conclusion, Martin 
recounts an anecdote that reflects 
on the book’s overall argument 
about the oddly irrational and het-
erogeneous practices of curiosity 
that undergird the development of 
scientific rationality. Explaining to 
a car full of acquaintances his thesis, 
for instance, that the  epistemology of 
modern medical science was predi-
cated on dead bodies rather than on 
living ones, Martin tells his audi-
ence that “when we walk into a doc-
tor’s surgery it is a dead body that is 
presented before them, not our vital 
and living body” (178). Not only 
has the anatomical gaze of medical 
science long been founded on the 
study of cadavers, but, as Martin 
contends, the “normative body” 
of the medical discipline derives 
from the profession’s recourse to 
“inert, dissected, criminal bodies” 
(71) during the  sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. In his concluding 
anecdote, Martin reports that one 
of his interlocutors, an incredu-
lous marine scientist, retorted, “I’m 
sorry, David. I don’t think any doc-
tor would agree with you. I know, 
for one, that when a specimen is in 
front of me, I imagine it as alive, it is 
a living body that I see and to which 
my observations are directed” (178). 
The point of Martin’s anecdote is 
less to bolster the immediate histor-
icist claim that the cadaver figures 
strongly in the genealogy of the 
medical discipline than to register 
a blind spot in  scientific resistance 
to his archaeological scholarship. 
What makes the anecdote telling is 
that this response mirrors his point 
but does not refute it. The discus-
sant sees the dead specimen as alive 
but doesn’t notice how this sleight 
of hand depends on an operation of 
“revelation and concealment” (188).
Martin’s argument here bears 
a latent, yet insistent, political 
charge. His anecdote is reminis-
cent of an old joke about a car 
mechanic and a surgeon, in which 
their difference in professional 
status comes down to the same 
distinction between living and 
dead bodies. Having repaired the 
surgeon’s car—meticulously strip-
ping its engine, cleaning each part, 
and reassembling the vehicle—the 
mechanic returns the keys to his 
wealthy customer and says, “You 
know, you and I are really quite the 
same. We both open up the bodies 
of the patients we work on, expose 
the guts, and fix all the right parts 
in order to keep the machine up 
and running. Yet it’s you who gets 
paid the big bucks. Why is this?” 
The surgeon impatiently takes 
the keys, waits a beat, and then 
replies, “Yes, well, try repairing 
it while the engine is running.” 
The joke, as Martin demonstrates 
throughout his book, is tied to the 
epistemological double vision of 
modern reason: it privileges both 
the implicit humanism of the liv-
ing, the organic engine over the 
inorganic mechanism of the car, 
and the procedural distinction 
between working on a running 
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motor and working on an arrested 
one. Yet, to the extent that the joke 
works, its proposition directs us to 
the mechanic’s insight: the sur-
geon’s condescending distinction 
exhausts the show in the tell by 
reinforcing the ideologically com-
monplace hierarchy— reminiscent 
of the surgeon’s superiority to the 
barber—which the mechanic’s 
remark breaks with a fascinating, 
if disarmingly literal, spell of epis-
temological continuity.
Martin’s own meditations on 
the role of curiosity and magical 
thinking in the function of dis-
course come to light in his conclu-
sion to the anecdote. As Martin 
reflects, the notion that the sur-
geon would see “only a living 
body” is, he writes, “precisely the 
point of the matter: that modern 
science is possessed of a gaze that 
allows its practitioners to envis-
age (or, should I say, have visions 
of) the dead-as-living” (178). 
The contemporary practice of 
medicine may be removed from 
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century practice of illustrating 
flayed and dissected cadavers as 
animated, classically posed bod-
ies, yet the rhetorical strategy of 
bringing such corpses to life, of 
subsuming the dead bodies and 
specimen part-objects of medi-
cal experimentation and training 
within an disciplinary framework 
of “life science,” persists with “the 
very discursive structures of sci-
entific practice itself, as an innate, 
prescient scientific ‘vision’” (179). 
“Viewing, tracing and explor-
ing the ambivalent ‘desire’ as a 
function of discourse” means to 
tell without telling all, so as not 
to exhaust the show in the pro-
cess. Martin’s Curious Visions thus 
strives to restore some of the vital 
glamour to knowledge, and some 
of the magic to erudition.
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